English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We experimentally evaluate the comparative performance of the winner-bid,average-bid, and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. Theanalysis of these auctions based on the empirical equilibrium refinement ofVelez and Brown (2020) arXiv:1907.12408 reveals that as long as behaviorsatisfies weak payoff monotonicity, winner-bid and loser-bid auctionsnecessarily exhibit a form of bias when empirical distributions of playapproximate best responses (Velez and Brown, 2020 arXiv:1905.08234). We findsupport for both weak payoff monotonicity and the form of bias predicted by thetheory for these two auctions. Consistently with the theory, the average-bidauction does not exhibit this form of bias. It has lower efficiency that thewinner-bid auction, however.

Empirical bias and efficiency of alpha-auctions: experimental evidence