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LTE/LTE-Advanced networks are known to be vulnerable to denial-of-service andloss-of-service attacks from smart jammers. In this article, the interactionbetween a smart jammer and LTE network is modeled as an infinite-horizon,zero-sum, asymmetric repeated game. The smart jammer and eNode B are modeled asthe informed and the uninformed player, respectively. The main purpose of thisarticle is to construct efficient suboptimal strategies for both players thatcan be used to solve the above-mentioned infinite-horizon repeated game withasymmetric and incomplete information. It has been shown in game-theoreticliterature that security strategies provide optimal solution in zero-sum games.It is also shown that both players' security strategies in an infinite-horizonasymmetric game depend only on the history of the informed player's actions.However, fixed-sized sufficient statistics are needed for both players to solvethe above-mentioned game efficiently. The smart jammer uses its evolving beliefstate as the fixed-sized sufficient statistics for the repeated game. Whereas,the LTE network (uninformed player) uses worst-case regret of its securitystrategy and its anti-discounted update as the fixed-sized sufficientstatistics. Although fixed-sized sufficient statistics are employed by bothplayers, optimal security strategy computation in {\lambda}-discountedasymmetric games is still hard to perform because of non-convexity. Hence, theproblem is convexified in this article by devising `approximated' securitystrategies for both players that are based on approximated optimal game value.However, `approximated' strategies require full monitoring. Therefore, asimplistic yet effective `expected' strategy is also constructed for the LTEnetwork that does not require full monitoring. The simulation results show thatthe smart jammer plays non-revealing and misleading strategies.

Smart Jammer and LTE Network Strategies in An Infinite-Horizon Zero-Sum Repeated Game with Asymmetric and Incomplete Information