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We investigate Apple's Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Continuity protocol,designed to support interoperability and communication between iOS and macOSdevices, and show that the price for this seamless experience is leakage ofidentifying information and behavioral data to passive adversaries. First, wereverse engineer numerous Continuity protocol message types and identify datafields that are transmitted unencrypted. We show that Continuity messages arebroadcast over BLE in response to actions such as locking and unlocking adevice's screen, copying and pasting information, making and accepting phonecalls, and tapping the screen while it is unlocked. Laboratory experimentsreveal a significant flaw in the most recent versions of macOS that defeats BLEMedia Access Control (MAC) address randomization entirely by causing the publicMAC address to be broadcast. We demonstrate that the format and content ofContinuity messages can be used to fingerprint the type and Operating System(OS) version of a device, as well as behaviorally profile users. Finally, weshow that predictable sequence numbers in these frames can allow an adversaryto track Apple devices across space and time, defeating existing anti-trackingtechniques such as MAC address randomization.

Handoff All Your Privacy: A Review of Apple's Bluetooth Low Energy Continuity Protocol