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We present a principal-agent model of a one-shot, shallow, systemsengineering process. The process is one-shot in the sense that decisions aremade during one time step and that they are final. The term shallow refers to aone-layer hierarchy of the process. Specifically, we assume that the systemsengineer has already decomposed the problem in subsystems, and that eachsubsystem is assigned to a different subsystem engineer. Each subsystemengineer works independently to maximize their own expected payoff. The goal ofthe systems engineer is to maximize the system-level payoff by incentivizingthe subsystem engineers. We restrict our attention to requirement-basedsystem-level payoffs, i.e., the systems engineer makes a profit only if all thedesign requirements are met. We illustrate the model using the design of anEarth-orbiting satellite system where the systems engineer determines theoptimum incentive structures and requirements for two subsystems: thepropulsion subsystem and the power subsystem. The model enables the analysis ofa systems engineer's decisions about optimal passed-down requirements andincentives for sub-system engineers under different levels of task difficultyand associated costs. Sample results, for the case of risk-neutral systems andsubsystems engineers, show that it is not always in the best interest of thesystems engineer to pass down the true requirements. As expected, the modelpredicts that for small to moderate task uncertainties the optimal requirementsare higher than the true ones, effectively eliminating the probability offailure for the systems engineer. In contrast, the model predicts that forlarge task uncertainties the optimal requirements should be smaller than thetrue ones in order to lure the subsystem engineers into participation.

A Principal-Agent Model of Systems Engineering Processes with Application to Satellite Design