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Recently there have been several historical changes in electricity networksthat necessitate the development of Demand Side Management (DSM). The mainobjective of DSM is to achieve an aggregated consumption pattern that isefficient in terms of energy cost reduction, welfare maximization andsatisfaction of network constraints. This is generally envisaged by encouragingelectricity use at low-peak times. In this paper, we consider a system withstrategic, price anticipating consumers with private preferences that choosetheir electricity consumption patterns so as to maximize their own benefit. Inthis context, we take on the problem of coordinating the consumers' consumptionbehavior without sacrificing their welfare (Quality of Experience). In order totackle this problem, we draw on concepts of indirect mechanism design andpropose a DSM architecture that is able to fulfill specific system-wideconstraints (e.g. energy cost reduction) and simultaneously achieve welfarethat is very close to optimal. The proposed billing rule preserves both thebudget-balance and the individual rationality properties. According to ourevaluation, the proposed DSM architecture achieves a close to optimalallocation (1%-3% gap), compared to an "optimal" system that would use centraloptimization of user loads without user consensus or protection of theirprivacy

Near-optimal demand side management in retail electricity markets with coupling constraints via indirect mechanism design