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Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of mostpressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggestthat reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing)judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether toinstrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people.However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they failto capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment toimpartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model ofutilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components.The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying onintuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumentalharm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? Toanswer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, twopreregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation onmoral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, withintuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH - as suggested by previouswork - but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposedtwo-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenuesfor future research.

Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence