English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Information is a critical dimension in warfare. Inaccurate information suchas misinformation or disinformation further complicates military operations. Inthis paper, we examine the value of misinformation and disinformation to amilitary leader who through investment in people, programs and technology isable to affect the accuracy of information communicated between other actors.We model the problem as a partially observable stochastic game with threeagents, a leader and two followers. We determine the value to the leader ofmisinformation or disinformation being communicated between two (i) adversarialfollowers and (ii) allied followers. We demonstrate that only under certainconditions, the prevalent intuition that the leader would benefit from less(more) accurate communication between adversarial (allied) followers is valid.We analyzed why the intuition may fail and show a holistic paradigm taking intoaccount both the reward structures and policies of agents is necessary in orderto correctly determine the value of misinformation and disinformation. Ourresearch identifies efficient targeted investments to affect the accuracy ofinformation communicated between followers to the leader's advantage.

The Value of Misinformation and Disinformation