English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Incentive mechanism design has aroused extensive attention for crowdsourcingapplications in recent years. Most research assumes that participants arealready in the system and aware of the existence of crowdsourcing tasks.Whereas in real life scenarios without this assumption, it is a more effectiveway to leverage incentive tree mechanisms that incentivize both users' directcontributions and solicitations to other users. Although some such mechanismshave been investigated, we are the first to propose budget-consistent incentivetree mechanisms, called generalized lottrees, which require the total payout toall participants to be consistent with the announced budget, while guaranteeingseveral other desirable properties including continuing contribution incentive,continuing solicitation incentive, value proportional to contribution,unprofitable solicitor bypassing, and unprofitable sybil attack. Moreover, wepresent three types of generalized lottree mechanisms, 1-Pachira, K-Pachira,and Sharing-Pachira, which support more diversified requirements. A solidtheoretical guidance to the mechanism selection is provided as well based onthe Cumulative Prospect Theory. Both extensive simulations and realisticexperiments with 82 users have been conducted to confirm our theoreticalanalysis.

Generalized Lottery Trees: Budget-Consistent Incentive Tree Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing