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This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reasonto prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: suchtheories are maximally rich in information and usually also maximally simple.(2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministicphysical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of aspecific system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initialconditions. This procedure works in the same manner for both classical andquantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason to take the parameters thatenter into the (deterministic) dynamical equations of physics to refer toproperties of the physical systems. Granting an ontological status toparameters such as mass, charge, wave functions and the like does not lead to again in explanation, but only to artificial problems. Against this background,I argue that there is no conflict between determinism in physics and free will(on whatever conception of free will), and, in general, point out the limits ofscience when it comes to the central metaphysical issues.

Why determinism in physics has no implications for free will