English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

Liquid democracy allows members of an electorate to either directly vote overalternatives, or delegate their voting rights to someone they trust. Most ofthe liquid democracy literature and implementations allow each voter tonominate only one delegate per election. However, if that delegate abstains,the voting rights assigned to her are left unused. To minimise the number ofunused delegations, it has been suggested that each voter should declare apersonal ranking over voters she trusts. In this paper, we show that even ifpersonal rankings over voters are declared, the standard delegation method ofliquid democracy remains problematic. More specifically, we show that whenpersonal rankings over voters are declared, it could be undesirable to receivedelegated voting rights, which is contrary to what liquid democracyfundamentally relies on. To solve this issue, we propose a new method todelegate voting rights in an election, called breadth-first delegation.Additionally, the proposed method prioritises assigning voting rights toindividuals closely connected to the voters who delegate.

Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth-First Delegation