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Recent evidence has emerged linking coordinated campaigns by state-sponsoredactors to manipulate public opinion on the Web. Campaigns revolving aroundmajor political events are enacted via mission-focused "trolls." While trollsare involved in spreading disinformation on social media, there is littleunderstanding of how they operate, what type of content they disseminate, howtheir strategies evolve over time, and how they influence the Web's informationecosystem. In this paper, we begin to address this gap by analyzing 10M postsby 5.5K Twitter and Reddit users identified as Russian and Iranianstate-sponsored trolls. We compare the behavior of each group ofstate-sponsored trolls with a focus on how their strategies change over time,the different campaigns they embark on, and differences between the trollsoperated by Russia and Iran. Among other things, we find: 1) that Russiantrolls were pro-Trump while Iranian trolls were anti-Trump; 2) evidence thatcampaigns undertaken by such actors are influenced by real-world events; and 3)that the behavior of such actors is not consistent over time, hence automateddetection is not a straightforward task. Using the Hawkes Processes statisticalmodel, we quantify the influence these accounts have on pushing URLs on foursocial platforms: Twitter, Reddit, 4chan's Politically Incorrect board (/pol/),and Gab. In general, Russian trolls were more influential and efficient inpushing URLs to all the other platforms with the exception of /pol/ whereIranians were more influential. Finally, we release our data and source code toensure the reproducibility of our results and to encourage other researchers towork on understanding other emerging kinds of state-sponsored troll accounts onTwitter.

Who Let The Trolls Out? Towards Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls