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Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a timelag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait forcompletion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are alsointerested in their waiting time as a Quality of Service (QoS) attribute. So,they factor this QoS in the demand they offer to the firm (service-provider)and some customers (user-set) would be willing to pay for shorter waitingtimes. On the other hand, such waiting times depend on the demand user-setoffers to the service-provider. We model the above economic-QoS strategicinteraction between service-provider and user-set under a fairly genericscheduling framework as a non-cooperative constrained game. We use an existingjoint pricing and scheduling model. An optimal solution to this joint pricingand scheduling problem was guaranteed by a finite step algorithm subject to aconjecture. We first settle this conjecture based on queuing and optimizationarguments and discuss its implications on the above game. We show that acontinuum of Nash equilibria (NE) exists and it can be computed easily usingconstrained best response dynamics. Revenue maximal NE is identified by abovefinite step algorithm. We illustrate how both players can benefit at suchrevenue maximal NE by identifying suitable operational decisions, i.e., bychoosing an appropriate game along the theme of pricing and revenue management.

On a Conjecture for Dynamic Priority Queues and Nash Equilibrium for Quality of Service Sensitive Markets