English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Network traffic inspection, including TLS traffic, in enterprise environmentsis widely practiced. Reasons for doing so are primarily related to improvingenterprise security (e.g., malware detection) and meeting legal requirements.To analyze TLS-encrypted data, network appliances implement a Man-in-the-MiddleTLS proxy, by acting as the intended web server to a requesting client (e.g., abrowser), and acting as the client to the outside web server. As such, the TLSproxy must implement both a TLS client and a server, and handle a large amountof traffic, preferably, in real-time. However, as protocol and implementationlayer vulnerabilities in TLS/HTTPS are quite frequent, these proxies must be,at least, as secure as a modern, up-to-date web browser, and a properlyconfigured web server. As opposed to client-end TLS proxies (e.g., as inseveral anti-virus products), the proxies in network appliances may servehundreds to thousands of clients, and any vulnerability in their TLSimplementations can significantly downgrade enterprise security.  To analyze TLS security of network appliances, we develop a comprehensiveframework, by combining and extending tests from existing work on client-endand network-based interception studies. We analyze thirteen representativenetwork appliances over a period of more than a year (including versions beforeand after notifying affected vendors, a total of 17 versions), and uncoverseveral security issues. For instance, we found that four appliances perform nocertificate validation at all, three use pre-generated certificates, and elevenaccept certificates signed using MD5, exposing their clients to MITM attacks.Our goal is to highlight the risks introduced by widely-used TLS proxies inenterprise and government environments, potentially affecting many systemshosting security, privacy, and financially sensitive data.

The Sorry State of TLS Security in Enterprise Interception Appliances