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The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) released its first 5Gsecurity specifications in March 2018. This paper reviews the 5G securityarchitecture, requirements and main processes and evaluates them in the contextof known and new protocol exploits. Although the security has been enhancedwhen compared to previous generations to tackle known protocol exploits, ouranalysis identifies some potentially unrealistic system assumptions that arecritical for security as well as a number protocol edge cases that could render5G systems vulnerable to adversarial attacks. For example, null encryption andnull authentication are supported and can be used in valid systemconfigurations, and certain key security functions are still left outside ofthe scope of the specifications. Moreover, the prevention of pre-authentcationmessage exploits appears to rely on the implicit assumption of impracticalcarrier and roaming agreements and the management of public keys from allglobal operators. In parallel, existing threats such as International MobileSubscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers are prevented only if the serving networkenforces optional security features and if the UE knows the public key of thehome network operator. The comparison with 4G LTE protocol exploits revealsthat the 5G security specifications, as of Release 15, do not fully address theuser privacy and network availability concerns, where one edge case cancompromise the privacy, security and availability of 5G users and services.

Security and Protocol Exploit Analysis of the 5G Specifications