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We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with twostrategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, andPlayer C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B,C$. Mainly we will show the following results.  1. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s is equivalent to theequilibrium when Players A and B choose $t_i$'s and Player C chooses $s_C$ astheir strategic variables. 2. The equilibrium when all players choose $s_i$'sis equivalent to the equilibrium when Players A and B choose $s_i$'s and PlayerC chooses $t_C$ as their strategic variables.  The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s and the equilibrium when allplayers choose $s_i$'s are not equivalent although they are equivalent in asymmetric game in which all players have the same payoff functions.

Nash equilibrium of partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables