English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a fast-growing wireless technology with a largenumber of potential use cases, particularly in the IoT domain. Increasingly,these use cases require the storage of sensitive user data or critical devicecontrols on the BLE device, as well as the access of this data by anaugmentative mobile application. Uncontrolled access to such data could violateuser privacy, cause a device to malfunction, or even endanger lives. The BLEstandard provides security mechanisms such as pairing and bonding to protectsensitive data such that only authenticated devices can access it. In thispaper we show how unauthorized co-located Android applications can accesspairing-protected BLE data, without the user's knowledge. We discuss mitigationstrategies in terms of the various stakeholders involved in this ecosystem, andargue that at present, the only possible option for securing BLE data is forBLE developers to implement remedial measures in the form of application-layersecurity between the BLE device and the Android application. We introduceBLECryptracer, a tool for identifying the presence of such application-layersecurity, and present the results of a large-scale static analysis over 18,900+BLE-enabled Android applications. Our findings indicate that over 45% of theseapplications do not implement measures to protect BLE data, and thatcryptography is sometimes applied incorrectly in those that do. This impliesthat a potentially large number of corresponding BLE peripheral devices arevulnerable to unauthorized data access.

A Study of the Feasibility of Co-located App Attacks against BLE and a Large-Scale Analysis of the Current Application-Layer Security Landscape