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This paper introduces the notion of cache-tapping into the informationtheoretic models of coded caching. The wiretap channel II in the presence ofmultiple receivers equipped with fixed-size cache memories, and an adversarywhich selects symbols to tap into from cache placement and/or delivery isintroduced. The legitimate terminals know neither whether placement, delivery,or both are tapped, nor the positions in which they are tapped. Only the sizeof the overall tapped set is known. For two receivers and two files, the strongsecrecy capacity -- the maximum achievable file rate while keeping the overalllibrary strongly secure -- is identified. Lower and upper bounds on the strongsecrecy file rate are derived when the library has more than two files.Achievability relies on a code design which combines wiretap coding, securityembedding codes, one-time pad keys, and coded caching. A genie-aided upperbound, in which the transmitter is provided with user demands before placement,establishes the converse for the two-files case. For more than two files, theupper bound is constructed by three successive channel transformations. Ourresults establish provable security guarantees against a powerful adversarywhich optimizes its tapping over both phases of communication in a cache-aidedsystem.

Coded Caching in the Presence of a Wire and a Cache Tapping Adversary of Type II