English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

The recent October 2016 DDoS attack on Dyn served as a wakeup call to thesecurity community as many popular and independent webservices (e.g., Twitter,Spotify) were impacted. This incident raises a larger question on the fragilityof modern webservices due to their dependence on third-party services. In thispaper, we characterize the dependencies of popular webservices on third partyservices and how these can lead to DoS, RoQ attacks, and reduction in securityposture. In particular, we focus on three critical infrastructure services:DNS, CDNs, and certificate authorities (CAs). We analyze both directrelationships (e.g., Twitter uses Dyn) and indirect dependencies (e.g., Netflixuses Symantec as OCSP and Symantec, in turn, uses Verisign for DNS). Our keyfindings are: (1) 73.14% of the top 100,000 popular services are vulnerable toreduction in availabil- ity due to potential attacks on third-party DNS, CDN,CA services that they exclusively rely on; (2) the use of third-party servicesis concentrated, so that if the top-10 providers of CDN, DNS and OCSP servicesgo down, they can potentially impact 25%-46% of the top 100K most popular webservices; (3) transitive depen- dencies significantly increase the set ofwebservices that exclusively depend on popular CDN and DNS service providers,in some cases by ten times (4) targeting even less popular webservices canpotentially cause signifi- cant collateral damage, affecting upto 20% of thetop- 100K webservices due to their shared dependencies. Based on our findings,we present a number of key implications and guidelines to guard against suchInternet- scale incidents in the future.

Oh, What a Fragile Web We Weave: Third-party Service Dependencies In Modern Webservices and Implications