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We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategicvariables. There are $n$ players, $n\geq 3$. Each player is denoted by $i$. Twostrategic variables are $t_i$ and $s_i$, $i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$. They arerelated by invertible functions. Using the minimax theorem by \cite{sion} wewill show that Nash equilibria in the following states are equivalent.  1. All players choose $t_i,\ i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$, (as their strategicvariables). 2. Some players choose $t_i$'s and the other players choose$s_i$'s. 3. All players choose $s_i,\ i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables