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A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distributionsystem is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasiticdc-voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in thelow-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication isover a distance, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference(EMI). Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison based defense methodthat exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistanceallowing information leak) does not function here. The attack is successfullydemonstrated. Proposed defense methods against it are shown.

A Static-Loop-Current Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange System