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This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasormeasurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector(BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses isproposed. Feasible conditions under which FDI attacks are unobservable to thisenhanced BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI attacksthat maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix is introduced. Simulationresults on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system indicate that the these multiplicativeunobservable attacks can avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and adetector based on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.

Unobservable False Data Injection Attacks against PMUs: Feasible Conditions and Multiplicative Attacks