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We propose a method to design a decentralized energy market which guaranteesindividual rationality (IR) in expectation, in the presence of system-levelgrid constraints. We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problemsubject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian duality to model theproblem as a n-person non-cooperative game with a unique generalized Nashequilibrium (GNE). We provide a distributed algorithm which converges to theGNE. The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated by meansof numerical simulations.

A rational decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium seeking for energy markets