English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

Modern applications are increasingly advanced and complex, and inevitablycontain exploitable software bugs despite the ongoing efforts. The applicationstoday often involve processing of sensitive information. However, the lack ofprivilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive application secretsuch as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a "hello world" string.Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced.However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility witholder generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with noportable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive applicationcomponent.  We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user spaceprivilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user executionlayer called PrivUser through harnessing the underused intermediate privilegelevels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pageswithin process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safeplace for application secrets and routines that access them. We implement theLOTRx86 ABI that exports the privilege-based, accessing the protectedapplication secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating theneed for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space.  We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabledweb server that employs our architecture to securely access its private keyduring SSL connection and thereby mitigating the HeartBleed vulnerability bydesign. We conducted a set of experiments including a performance measurementon the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only alimited performance overhead.

Lord of the x86 Rings: A Portable User Mode Privilege Separation Architecture on x86