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Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities inBitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism forbroadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to linktransactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundworkfor low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we presentDandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymizationattacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ buildsupon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However,in this paper, we highlight simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and showhow they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. Incontrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed todisobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completelyinteroperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it throughexperiments on Bitcoin's mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) todemonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.

Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees