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A recent discovery of a new class of microarchitectural attacks calledSpectre picked up the attention of the security community as these attacks cancircumvent many traditional mechanisms of defense. One of the attacks---BoundsCheck Bypass---can neither be efficiently solved on system nor architecturallevels and requires changes in the application itself. So far, the proposedmitigations involved serialization, which reduces the usage of CPU resourcesand causes high overheads. In this report, we explore methods of delaying thevulnerable instructions without complete serialization. We discuss several waysof achieving it and compare them with Speculative Load Hardening, an existingsolution based on a similar idea. The solutions of this type cause 60% overheadacross Phoenix benchmark suite, which compares favorably to the fullserialization causing 440% slowdown.

You Shall Not Bypass: Employing data dependencies to prevent Bounds Check Bypass