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Recently, several works conjectured the vulnerabilities of mainstreamblockchains under several network attacks. All these attacks translate intoshowing that the assumptions of these blockchains can be violated in theory orunder simulation at best. Unfortunately, previous results typically omit boththe nature of the network under which the blockchain code runs and whetherblockchains are private, consortium or public. In this paper, we study thepublic Ethereum blockchain as well as a consortium and private blockchains andquantify the feasibility of man-in-the-middle and double spending attacksagainst them. To this end, we list important properties of the Ethereum publicblockchain topology, we deploy VMs with constrained CPU quantum to mimic thetop-10 mining pools of Ethereum and we develop full-fledged attacks, that firstpartition the network through BGP hijacking or ARP spoofing before issuing aBalance Attack to steal coins. Our results demonstrate that attacking Ethereumis remarkably devastating in a consortium or private context as the adversarycan multiply her digital assets by 200, 000x in 10 hours through BGP hijackingwhereas it would be almost impossible in a public context.

Double-Spending Risk Quantification in Private, Consortium and Public Ethereum Blockchains