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Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, muchresearch has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand(Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimentalevidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such asPrisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven byoutcome-based social preferences - as classically assumed - but by ageneralized morality preference for "doing the right thing". Here we argue thatthe key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominentmethodological confounds and open questions that bear on influentialpsychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences forefficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferencesfor morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference todo "good" from the preference to avoid doing "bad". We thus designed andconducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preferencehypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate thatprosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferencesfor doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychologicaltheory, however, our results suggest the preference to do "good" was as potentas the preference to avoid doing "bad" in this case.

Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: A refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis