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Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gainedtremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralizedtamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization.Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable tocyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novelapproach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular,we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risksdue to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market,which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, thecyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from theinfrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain theblockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. Theblockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and theservice price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of theblockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provideralso purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself fromthe potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjuststhe insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchainservice. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, wemodel the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and thecyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain providerand the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and thenthe users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service.Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide aseries of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the marketgame.

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach