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This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sidedmarket in which agents behave strategically and trade according to theShapley-Shubik mechanism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns forothers on the opposite side of the market, it shows that agents always findadvantageous to trade. However, they prefer to stay out of the market andconsume their endowments when there are altruistic agents who have concerns forthe welfare of those on the same side of the market, or when there are spitefulagents. These non-trade situations occur either because the necessaryfirst-order conditions for optimality are violated or because agents' payofffunctions are not concave.

On Trade in Bilateral Oligopolies with Altruistic and Spiteful Agents