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Modern high-performance as well as power-constrained System-on-Chips (SoC)are increasingly using hardware accelerated encryption engines to securecomputation, memory access, and communication operations. The electromagnetic(EM) emission from a chip leaks information of the underlying logicaloperations and can be collected using low-cost non-invasive measurements. EMbased side-channel attacks (EMSCA) have emerged as a major threat to securityof encryption engines in a SoC. This paper presents the concept of Blindsightwhere a high-frequency inductive voltage regulator (IVR) integrated on the samechip with an encryption engine is used to increase resistance against EMSCA.High-frequency (~100MHz) IVRs are present in modern microprocessors to improveenergy-efficiency. We show that an IVR with a randomized control loop (R-IVR)can reduce EMSCA as the integrated inductance acts as a strong EM emitter andblinds an adversary from EM emission of the encryption engine. The EMmeasurements are performed on a test-chip containing two architectures of a128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) engine powered by a high-frequencyR-IVR and under two attack scenarios, one, where an adversary gains completephysical access of the target device and the other, where the adversary is onlyin proximity of the device. In both attack modes, an adversary can observeinformation leakage in Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) test in a baselineIVR (B-IVR, without control loop randomization). However, we show that EMemission from the R-IVR blinds the attacker and significantly reduces SCAvulnerability of the AES engine. A range of practical side-channel analysisincluding TVLA, Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA), and a templatebased CEMA shows that R-IVR can reduce information leakage and prevent keyextraction even against a skilled adversary.

Blindsight: Blinding EM Side-Channel Leakage using Built-In Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulator