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Publicly, ABS has said it would use a cryptographic hash function to convertnames collected in the 2016 Census of Population and Housing into anunrecognisable value in a way that is not reversible. In 2016, the ABS engagedthe University of Melbourne to provide expert advice on cryptographic hashfunctions to meet this objective.  For complex unit-record level data, including Census data, auxiliary data canbe often be used to link individual records, even without names. This is thebasis of ABS's existing bronze linking. This means that records can probably bere-identified without the encoded name anyway. Protection againstre-identification depends on good processes within ABS.  The undertaking on the encoding of names should therefore be considered inthe full context of auxiliary data and ABS processes. There are severalreasonable interpretations:  1. That the encoding cannot be reversed except with a secret key held by ABS.This is the property achieved by encryption (Option 1), if properlyimplemented;  2. That the encoding, taken alone without auxiliary data, cannot be reversedto a single value. This is the property achieved by lossy encoding (Option 2),if properly implemented;  3. That the encoding doesn't make re-identification easier, or increase thenumber of records that can be re-identified, except with a secret key held byABS. This is the property achieved by HMAC-based linkage key derivation usingsubsets of attributes (Option 3), if properly implemented.  We explain and compare the privacy and accuracy guarantees of five possibleapproaches. Options 4 and 5 investigate more sophisticated options for futuredata linking. We also explain how some commonly-advocated techniques can bereversed, and hence should not be used.

Options for encoding names for data linking at the Australian Bureau of Statistics