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With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuouslyseeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introducedto provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to itspseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which meanshistorical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. Weinvestigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor hidden services whorely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leakedfrom online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, forexample, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to aTor hidden service with private.onion address by finding at least one pasttransaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoinaddresses.  To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried outa real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled1.5K hidden services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K uniqueBitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with anonline identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing thetransactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Torhidden services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and SilkRoad. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate theimplications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. Inparticular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be consideredexploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This isespecially important for Tor hidden service users who actively seek and expectprivacy and anonymity.

Deanonymizing Tor hidden service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis