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Power analysis is a branch of side channel attacks where power consumptiondata is used as the side channel to attack the system. First using a devicelike an oscilloscope power traces are collected when the cryptographic deviceis doing the cryptographic operation. Then those traces are statisticallyanalysed using methods such as Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) to derive thesecret key of the system. Being possible to break Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) in few minutes, power analysis attacks have become a serious securityissue for cryptographic devices such as smart card.  As the first phase of our project, we build a testbed for doing research onpower analysis attacks. As power analysis is a practical type of attack inorder to do any research, a testbed is the first requirement. Since building atest bed is a complicated process, having a pre-built testbed would save thetime of future researchers. The second phase of our project is to attack thelatest cryptographic algorithm called Speck which has been released by NationalSecurity Agency (NSA) for use in embedded systems. In spite it has lot ofdifferences to AES making impossible to directly use the power analysisapproach used for AES, we introduce novel approaches to break Speck in lessthan an hour. In the third phase of the project, we select few alreadyintroduced countermeasures and practically attack them on our testbed to do acomparative analysis. We show that software countermeasures such as randominstruction injection and randomly shuffling S-boxes are good enough for theirsimplicity and cost. But we identify the possible threat due to the problem ofgenerating a good seed for the pseudo-random algorithm running on themicrocontroller. We attempt to address this issue by using a hardware-basedtrue random generator that amplifies a random electrical signal and samples togenerate a proper seed.

Power Analysis Based Side Channel Attack