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This paper studies lying in a novel context. Previous work has focused onsituations in which people are either fully aware of the economic consequencesof all available actions (e.g., die-under-cup paradigm), or they are uncertain,but this uncertainty cannot be cleared in any way (e.g., sender-receiver game).On the contrary, in reality, people oftentimes know that they will have achance to lie, they are initially uncertain about the economic consequences ofthe available actions, but they can invest resources (e.g., time) to find themout. Here we capture the essence of this type of situations by means of a noveldecision problem. Two experiments provide evidence of four empiricalregularities regarding the distribution of choices, and suggest thatparticipants vary along two dimensions: the moral cost of lying, and the costof investing time to find out the payoffs associated to the available actions.Taking inspiration from these observations, we introduce a model that isconsistent with the main empirical results.

On the heterogeneity of people's (dis)honest behavior along two dimensions: Cost of lying and cost of acquiring information