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Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solutionconcept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problemssuch as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertaintyregarding the model about the opponent. This paper is, to our knowledge, thefirst to investigate Stackelberg equilibria under uncertainty in extensive-formgames, one of the broadest classes of game. We introduce robust Stackelbergequilibria, where the uncertainty is about the opponent's payoffs, as well asones where the opponent has limited lookahead and the uncertainty is about theopponent's node evaluation function. We develop a new mixed-integer program forthe deterministic limited-lookahead setting. We then extend the program to therobust setting for Stackelberg equilibrium under unlimited and under limitedlookahead by the opponent. We show that for the specific case of intervaluncertainty about the opponent's payoffs (or about the opponent's nodeevaluations in the case of limited lookahead), robust Stackelberg equilibriacan be computed with a mixed-integer program that is of the same asymptoticsize as that for the deterministic setting.

Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead