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This paper considers secret-key generation between several agents and a basestation that observe independent and identically distributed realizations ofcorrelated random variables. Each agent wishes to generate the longest possibleindividual key with the base station by means of public communication. All keysmust be jointly kept secret from all external entities. In this many-to-onesecret-key generation setting, it can be shown that the agents can takeadvantage of a collective protocol to increase the sum-rate of their generatedkeys. However, when each agent is only interested in maximizing its ownsecret-key rate, agents may be unwilling to participate in a collectiveprotocol. Furthermore, when such a collective protocol is employed, how tofairly allocate individual key rates arises as a valid issue. This paperstudies this tension between cooperation and self-interest with agame-theoretic treatment. The work establishes that cooperation is in the bestinterest of all individualistic agents and that there exists individualsecret-key rate allocations that incentivize the agents to follow the protocol.Additionally, an explicit coding scheme that achieves such allocations isproposed.

Secret-Key Generation in Many-to-One Networks: An Integrated Game-Theoretic and Information-Theoretic Approach