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Automobiles are equipped with Electronic Control Units (ECU) that communicatevia in-vehicle network protocol standards such as Controller Area Network(CAN). These protocols are designed under the assumption that separatingin-vehicle communications from external networks is sufficient for protectionagainst cyber attacks. This assumption, however, has been shown to be invalidby recent attacks in which adversaries were able to infiltrate the in-vehiclenetwork. Motivated by these attacks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) havebeen proposed for in-vehicle networks that attempt to detect attacks by makinguse of device fingerprinting using properties such as clock skew of an ECU. Inthis paper, we propose the cloaking attack, an intelligent masquerade attack inwhich an adversary modifies the timing of transmitted messages in order tomatch the clock skew of a targeted ECU. The attack leverages the fact that,while the clock skew is a physical property of each ECU that cannot be changedby the adversary, the estimation of the clock skew by other ECUs is based onnetwork traffic, which, being a cyber component only, can be modified by anadversary. We implement the proposed cloaking attack and test it on two IDSs,namely, the current state-of-the-art IDS and a new IDS that we develop based onthe widely-used Network Time Protocol (NTP). We implement the cloaking attackon two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real connected vehicle, and showthat it can always deceive both IDSs. We also introduce a new metric called theMaximum Slackness Index to quantify the effectiveness of the cloaking attackeven when the adversary is unable to precisely match the clock skew of thetargeted ECU.

Cloaking the Clock: Emulating Clock Skew in Controller Area Networks