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This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographicimplementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discoversvulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed asexploitable leakage. The methodology works by identifying secret dependentmemory and introducing forced evictions inside potentially vulnerable code toobtain cache traces that are analyzed using Mutual Information. If dependenceis observed, the cryptographic implementation is classified as to leakinformation.  We demonstrate the viability of our technique in the design of the three maincryptographic primitives, i.e., AES, RSA and ECC, in eight popular up to datecryptographic libraries, including OpenSSL, Libgcrypt, Intel IPP and NSS. Ourresults show that cryptographic code designers are far away from incorporatingthe appropriate countermeasures to avoid cache leakages, as we found that 50%of the default implementations analyzed leaked information that lead to keyextraction. We responsibly notified the designers of all the leakages found andsuggested patches to solve these vulnerabilities.

Did we learn from LLC Side Channel Attacks? A Cache Leakage Detection Tool for Crypto Libraries