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Advances in reverse engineering make it challenging to deploy any on-chipinformation in a way that is hidden from a determined attacker. A variety oftechniques have been proposed for design obfuscation including look-alike cellsin which functionality is determined by hard to observe mechanisms includingdummy vias or transistor threshold voltages. Threshold-based obfuscation isespecially promising because threshold voltages cannot be observed opticallyand require more sophisticated measurements by the attacker. In this work, wedemonstrate the effectiveness of a methodology that applies threshold-definedbehavior to memory cells, in combination with error correcting codes to achievea high degree of protection against invasive reverse engineering. Thecombination of error correction and small threshold manipulations issignificant because it makes the attacker's job harder without compromising thereliability of the obfuscated key. We present analysis to quantify keyreliability of our approach, and its resistance to reverse engineering attacksthat seek to extract the key through imperfect measurement of transistorthreshold voltages. The security analysis and cost metrics we provide allowdesigners to make a quantifiable tradeoff between cost and security. We findthat the combination of small threshold offsets and stronger error correctingcodes are advantageous when security is the primary objective.

Threshold-based Obfuscated Keys with Quantifiable Security against Invasive Readout