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Hosting providers play a key role in fighting web compromise, but theirability to prevent abuse is constrained by the security practices of their owncustomers. {\em Shared} hosting, offers a unique perspective since customersoperate under restricted privileges and providers retain more control overconfigurations. We present the first empirical analysis of the distribution ofweb security features and software patching practices in shared hostingproviders, the influence of providers on these security practices, and theirimpact on web compromise rates. We construct provider-level features on theglobal market for shared hosting -- containing 1,259 providers -- by gatheringindicators from 442,684 domains. Exploratory factor analysis of 15 indicatorsidentifies four main latent factors that capture security efforts: contentsecurity, webmaster security, web infrastructure security and web applicationsecurity. We confirm, via a fixed-effect regression model, that providers exertsignificant influence over the latter two factors, which are both related tothe software stack in their hosting environment. Finally, by means of GLMregression analysis of these factors on phishing and malware abuse, we showthat the four security and software patching factors explain between 10\% and19\% of the variance in abuse at providers, after controlling for size. Forweb-application security for instance, we found that when a provider moves fromthe bottom 10\% to the best-performing 10\%, it would experience 4 times fewerphishing incidents. We show that providers have influence over patchlevels--even higher in the stack, where CMSes can run as client-sidesoftware--and that this influence is tied to a substantial reduction in abuselevels.

Herding Vulnerable Cats: A Statistical Approach to Disentangle Joint Responsibility for Web Security in Shared Hosting