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We show how third-party web trackers can deanonymize users ofcryptocurrencies. We present two distinct but complementary attacks. On mostshopping websites, third party trackers receive information about userpurchases for purposes of advertising and analytics. We show that, if the userpays using a cryptocurrency, trackers typically possess enough informationabout the purchase to uniquely identify the transaction on the blockchain, linkit to the user's cookie, and further to the user's real identity. Our secondattack shows that if the tracker is able to link two purchases of the same userto the blockchain in this manner, it can identify the user's entire cluster ofaddresses and transactions on the blockchain, even if the user employsblockchain anonymity techniques such as CoinJoin. The attacks are passive andhence can be retroactively applied to past purchases. We discuss severalmitigations, but none are perfect.

When the cookie meets the blockchain: Privacy risks of web payments via cryptocurrencies