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This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicastingsystem, where multiple power beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter inorder to establish a reliable communication link with multiple legitimate usersin the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radiofrequency (RF) energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded powersupply before establishing its secure communication. We consider two differentscenarios. In the first, the PBs and the transmitter belong to the sameoperator, where we formulate the resource allocation problem as theminimization of the total transmit power subject to the target secure rateconstraint. The solution of this problem yields both the optimal power andenergy transfer time allocation. Due to the non-convexity of this problem, wepropose a two-level approach, where the inner level problem can be recast as aconvex optimization framework via conic convex reformulation, while the outerlevel problem can be handled by using one-dimensional (1D) search. The secondscenario considers the case where the transmitter and the PBs belong todifferent service suppliers. Hence, we formulate the resource allocationproblem where we consider incentives for the PBs to assist the transmitter.This leads to the formulation of a Stackelberg game for the securewireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system. The transmitter has to payfor the energy services from these multiple PBs in order to facilitate securecommunications. In this game, the transmitter and the PB are modelled as leaderand follower, respectively, in which both of them try to maximize their ownutility function. The closed-form Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulatedgame is then derived. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate ourproposed schemes.

Resource Allocation Strategies for Secure WPCN Multiantenna Multicasting Systems