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Given a large population of players, each player has three possible choicesbetween option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options are equally favorable andthe population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and ina distributed way. The more popular an option is, the more likely it is to bechosen by uncommitted players. Uncommitted players can be attracted by thosecommitted to any of the other two options through a cross-inhibitory signal.This model originates in the context of honeybees swarms, and we generalize itto duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics. The contributions of this workinclude (1) the formulation of an evolutionary game model to explain thebehavioral traits of the honeybees, (2) the study of the individuals andcollective behavior including equilibrium points and stability, (3) theextension of the results to the case of structured environment via complexnetwork theory, (4) the analysis of the impact of the connectivity onconsensus, and (5) the study of absolute stability for the collective systemunder time-varying and uncertain cross-inhibitory parameter.

Bio-inspired Evolutionary Game Dynamics on Complex Networks under Uncertain Cross-inhibitory Signals