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In this study, we develop a theoretical model of strategic equilibriumbidding and price-setting behaviour by heterogeneous and boundedly rationalelectricity producers and a grid operator in a single electricity market underuncertain information about production capabilities and electricity demand.  We compare eight different market design variants and several levels ofcentralized electricity production that influence the spatial distribution ofproducers in the grid, their unit production and curtailment costs, and themean and standard deviation of their production capabilities.  Our market design variants differ in three aspects. Producers are either paidtheir individual bid price ("pay as bid") or the (higher) market price set bythe grid operator ("uniform pricing"). They are either paid for their bidquantity ("pay requested") or for their actual supply ("pay supplied") whichmay differ due to production uncertainty. Finally, excess production is eitherrequired to be curtailed or may be supplied to the grid.  Overall, we find the combination of uniform pricing, paying for requestedamounts, and required curtailment to perform best or second best in manyrespects, and to provide the best compromise between the goals of low economiccosts, low consumer costs, positive profits, low balancing, low workload, andhonest bidding behaviour.

Comparison of electricity market designs for stable decentralized power grids