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Each participant in peer-to-peer network prefers to free-ride on thecontribution of other participants. Reputation based resource sharing is a wayto control the free riding. Instead of classical game theory we useevolutionary game theory to analyse the reputation based resource sharing inpeer to peer system. Classical game-theoretical approach requires globalinformation of the population. However, the evolutionary games only assumeslight cognitive capabilities of users, that is, each user imitates the behaviorof other user with better payoff. We find that without any extra benefitreputation strategy is not stable in the system. We also find the fraction ofusers who calculate the reputation for controlling the free riding inequilibrium. In this work first we made a game theoretical model for thereputation system and then we calculate the threshold of the fraction of userswith which the reputation strategy is sustainable in the system. We found thatin simplistic conditions reputation calculation is not evolutionarily stablestrategy but if we impose some initial payment to all users and then distributethat payment among the users who are calculating reputation then reputation isevolutionary stable strategy.

Evolutionary Stability of Reputation Management System in Peer to Peer Networks