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We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics underthe logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games,symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, whichsatisfies the marginal bandwagon property (i.e., there is positive feedback tocoordinate). Our main result is that the most likely evolutionary escape pathsfrom a status quo convention consist of a series of identical mistakes. As anapplication of our result, we show that the Nash bargaining solution arises asthe long run convention for the evolutionary Nash demand game under the usuallogit choice rule. We also obtain a new bargaining solution if the logit choicerule is combined with intentional idiosyncratic plays. The new bargainingsolution is more egalitarian than the Nash bargaining solution, demonstratingthat intentionality implies equality under the logit choice model.

Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule