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This work is concerned with the application of game theoretic principles tomodel competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energystored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in apower market. This market framework is presented as an alternative to thetraditional vertically integrated market structure, which may be better suitedfor developing demand response and smart grid technologies, in addition toincreasing penetration of independent renewable energy generation devices.Demand for power generated by the utility through combustion of fuel could bereplaced, lowering emission of pollutants, when the energy used to charge thebatteries is produced sustainably and traded on smaller scales. The fourvariants of game are considered: both non-cooperative (unregulated competition)and Stackelberg (regulations on transaction price and size), each with andwithout DR scheduling. The Nash equilibrium is derived for each game variant inorder to serve as a bid-price decision making criteria which determines theoptimal bidding strategy for an aggregator to sell in the market. The model isapplied to a case study involving completion for selling between twoaggregators. Bidding strategy is dependent on parameters inherent to anaggregator's energy storage hardware, and the strategy selected by eachaggregator does not vary with the variations in the game conditions considered.Demand response scheduling offers greater payoff for aggregators who implementit, compared with those who do not. Addition of transaction price and volumeregulations to the market do not affect the participants optimal biddingstrategies (the Nash equilibrium), but lowers payoffs for all aggregatorsparticipating in the market relative to unregulated competition.

A Game Theoretic Model of Demand Response Aggregator Competition for Selling Stored Energy in Regulated and Unregulated Power Markets