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Rowhammer is a hardware bug that can be exploited to implement privilegeescalation and remote code execution attacks. Previous proposals on rowhammermitigation either require hardware changes or follow heuristic-based approaches(based on CPU performance counters). To date, there exists no instantprotection against rowhammer attacks on legacy systems.  In this paper, we present the design and implementation of two practical andefficient software-only defenses against rowhammer attacks. Our defensesprevent the attacker from leveraging rowhammer to corrupt physically co-locateddata in memory that is owned by a different system entity. Our first defense,B-CATT, extends the system bootloader to disable vulnerable physical memory.B-CATT is highly practical, does not require changes to the operating system,and can be deployed on virtually all x86-based systems. While B-CATT is able tostop all known rowhammer attacks, it does not yet tackle the fundamentalproblem of missing memory isolation in physical memory. To address thisproblem, we introduce our second defense G-CATT, a generic solution thatextends the physical memory allocator of the OS to physically isolate thememory of different system entities (e.g., kernel and user space).  As proof of concept, we implemented B-CATT on x86, and our generic defense,G-CATT, on x86 and ARM to mitigate rowhammer-based kernel exploits. Ourextensive evaluation shows that both mitigation schemes (i) can stop availablereal- world rowhammer attacks, (ii) impose virtually no run-time overhead forcommon user and kernel benchmarks as well as commonly used applications, and(iii) do not affect the stability of the overall system.

CAn't Touch This: Practical and Generic Software-only Defenses Against Rowhammer Attacks