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We show that the new hover (floating touch) technology, available in a numberof today's smartphone models, can be abused by any Android application runningwith a common SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to record all touchscreen inputinto other applications. Leveraging this attack, a malicious applicationrunning on the system is therefore able to profile user's behavior, capturesensitive input such as passwords and PINs as well as record all user's socialinteractions. To evaluate our attack we implemented Hoover, a proof-of-conceptmalicious application that runs in the system background and records all inputto foreground applications. We evaluated Hoover with 40 users, across twodifferent Android devices and two input methods, stylus and finger. In the caseof touchscreen input by finger, Hoover estimated the positions of users' clickswithin an error of 100 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 79%.Hoover captured users' input by stylus even more accurately, estimating users'clicks within 2 pixels and keyboard input with an accuracy of 98%. We discussways of mitigating this attack and show that this cannot be done by simplyrestricting access to permissions or imposing additional cognitive load on theusers since this would significantly constrain the intended use of the hovertechnology.

Using Hover to Compromise the Confidentiality of User Input on Android