English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in theHotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst votingrules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote,i.e., each voter can vote in favour of one candidate and against another one.The weights attached to positive and negative votes in calculating acandidate's net score may be different, so that a negative vote and a positivevote need not cancel out exactly. These rules combine the first-place seekingincentives of plurality with the incentives to avoid being ranked last ofanti-plurality. We show that these rules generally admit equilibria, which arenonconvergent if and only if the importance of a positive vote exceeds that ofa negative vote. The set of equilibria in the latter case is very similar tothat of plurality, except that the platforms are less extreme due to themoderating effect of negative votes. Moreover, any degree of dispersion betweenplurality, at one extreme, and full convergence, at the other, can be attainedfor the correct choice of the weights.

Electoral Competition under Best-Worst Voting Rules